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Patrick Chabal 
 
Area studies and comparative politics: Africa in context1 
 
 
t is frequently proclaimed, loudest and clearest in the United States, that 
Area Studies are finished, and this for a wide array of reasons.2 They are 
said to have failed significantly to illuminate the events they purport to ex-
plain and, from a policy point of view, to have been ill-equipped to anticipate 
the major changes that have recently taken place in vast swathes of the world: 
globalisation is said to be sweeping away area ‘particularisms’.  Furthermore, 
it is argued that their analytical weakness is congenital since it is rooted in 
their very ‘multi-disciplinarity’: area specialists are seen as  not properly 
trained in the social sciences and thus not equipped to develop their work 
within a proper comparative perspective.  Whether these charges are justified 
or not, it is well to remember that the present swing against Area Studies is 
also, and perhaps primarily, due to the reluctance of governments and fund-
ing agencies to continue to support what are often seen as relatively expen-
sive ‘minority’ programmes. 
My concern here, however, is no so much to seek to justify continued 
funding for Area Studies on the basis of their ‘usefulness’ – however that may 
be defined.  It is to examine the very question of area specialisation, chiefly in 
respect of Africa, within the context of the ongoing debate about comparative 
politics. The issue at stake, then, is whether an Area Studies approach can 
help us understand better the evolution of Africa since independence.  It is 
not a question that we can, or seek to, avoid. Indeed, present debates about 
the future of the continent show clearly that the assessment of current trends 
in Africa is largely predicated on our approach to this question. The view that 
Africa is now, finally, following a ‘universal’ path – meaning democratisation 
and free market economics – derives from the assumption that all societies 
develop historically in similar ways regardless of local conditions. On the 
other hand, the notion that Africa is moving in a direction that separates it 
further from the rest of the world rests on the belief that its very special cir-
                                                 
1 A preliminary version of this article was presented in the Department of Politics, Univer-
sity of Lund on 20 March 2002. 
2 For a comprehensive discussion of Area Studies in the United States, see Ruguet, V.  2004 :   
‘La politique comparée aux Etats-Unis et la question des area studies’. In Thiriot, C. / Marty, 
M. & Nadal, E. (eds.) , Penser la politique comparée: un état des savoirs théoriques et méthodologi-
ques .  Paris: Karthala. 
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cumstances, which require ‘expert’ analysis, are preventing it from develop-
ing ‘satisfactorily’. 
 It can thus be seen that the debate about the usefulness of Area Studies is 
of the utmost relevance to the understanding of Africa.  It is not merely aca-
demic.  Although the discussion that follows is centred on the relationship 
between Area Studies and comparative politics in general, rather than on 
Africa per se, it is a reflection that is critical to the future of African Studies.  
My argument is that the analysis of contemporary Africa is constrained not so 
much by a lack of data but by methodological weaknesses – weaknesses that 
are in many ways linked to the uncertain dialogue between comparative poli-
tics and Area Studies. That dialogue has been vitiated in the recent past by a 
general trend away from area specialisation, first in the United States and 
now in Europe. All told, this is probably not a healthy development from the 
point of view of making sense of what is happening in Africa, as this article 
will try to show. The point, then, is not to defend Area Studies on principle 
but to show how the political analysis of Africa would benefit from an ap-
proach that made intellectually coherent use of its specialist knowledge. 
 Although the question of Area Studies is habitually confined to the mar-
gins of the social sciences, it ought in fact to be at the heart of our reflection on 
comparative politics. Indeed, I believe the loss of confidence about Area Stud-
ies is due in part to the current ‘conceptual’ crisis in comparative politics. The 
publication of Lichbach and Zuckerman’s volume on the subject is clearly a 
call for greater theoretical consistency in the field of comparative politics and 
a plea for academic debate between its three main areas: rational choice, struc-
tural, and cultural approaches.3 Typically, however, this volume says nothing 
about Area Studies, which remains a black hole at its centre, since even the 
chapters on cultural perspectives do not properly address the issue.   
 Yet, the question of how best to ‘compare’ politics across the globe cannot 
ultimately be disassociated from that of Area Studies. How can one ‘do’ com-
parative politics without comparing ‘areas’ – in one way or another?  Con-
versely, how can one understand ‘areas’ without ‘making’ comparisons?  
Comparative politics is, virtually by definition, an attempt to draw generalisa-
tions from the examination of various parts of the world, whether they are 
labelled ‘areas’ or not. Even comparisons between individual countries in 
widely different regions must perforce be built on assumptions relating to the 
ways in which they may, or may not, display political attributes similar to 
those of the countries with which they are most readily associated.  Hence, the 
notion that one can compare political elites in Brazil, the United States, Swe-
den and Italy, without reference to how the politics of elites within those 
countries fits in within, say, a regional context is very largely illusory. 
                                                 
3  Lichbach, M. & Zuckerman, A. (eds.)1997: Comparative Politics: rationality, culture and struc-
ture.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Of course, one of the main reasons why there is often a reluctance to acknowl-
edge the link between Area Studies and comparative politics is that the very 
notion of ‘area’ raises the issue of culture and the issue of culture is often pro-
foundly unsettling to political scientists.4 But since the heuristic value of com-
parative politics ought only to be judged according to its capacity to make 
sense of what is happening in the real world, it is necessary to consider how 
comparative politics handles matters of culture. Thus, whatever the approach 
chosen, it is hardly possible to advance hypotheses about comparative politi-
cal behaviour without making assumptions about the role of culture in poli-
tics.   
 Rational choice theory, in its vain quest to emulate economics, tries to 
factor culture out by narrowing the realm of political action to its lowest 
common denominator: individual self-interest. Other approaches, whether 
institutional or structural, try to ‘tame’ culture into more recognisably catego-
ries of political behaviour that are amenable to quantitative or qualitative 
comparisons. Cultural theories posit that an explanation of what is happening 
must be rooted in the understanding of the relevant culture.  But none of 
them finds it especially appropriate to rely on Area Studies for comparative 
purposes. Why? 
 There are two types of objections to Area Studies: one is concerned with 
their ‘scientific’ weakness, the other with their lack of perspective. On the first 
point, it is indeed true that the flowering of ‘area’ studies since the sixties has 
given rise to a large number of activities, which may seem to contribute very 
little to the advancement of scientific knowledge. A genuine desire to focus 
attention on the specificities of certain groups of people, or countries, or re-
gions, has often become a self-referential industry in which ‘identity special-
ists’ with little serious disciplinary training debate points of political correct-
ness. The development of undergraduate degrees in Area Studies, bringing 
together students interested in subjects as diverse as literature, psychology 
and history, for instance, has done little to contribute to a body of ‘scientific’ 
scholarly work. Quite understandably, social scientists trained in a recognised 
discipline (anthropology, economics, politics, sociology) have often criticised 
Area Studies for being a theoretical or conceptual potpourri of very little rele-
vance to the more serious work of comparative analysis.5 
                                                 
4   On the question of culture and politics, see Chabal, P. / Daloz, J.-P.  2005: Culture Trou-
bles: politics and the interpretation of meaning. London: Hurst and Chicago: Chicago Uni-
versity Press. Much of the argument presented in this article derives from Culture Troubles, 
which offers a systematic theoretical and methodological discussion of what culture means 
and how a cultural approach to comparative politics makes it possible to compare distinct 
polities. 
5   Here the example of African-American Studies programmes purporting to study Africa 
comes readily to mind. 
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Equally, Area Studies have undoubtedly suffered from the consequences of 
excessive specialisation. Students trained in a particular ‘area’, with little or 
no schooling in one of the social sciences, and whose research has been en-
tirely devoted to that ‘area’ not infrequently begin to lose perspective. En-
trapped in the intricacies of their specialty, they ‘go native’. The cultures or 
peoples on which they focus their attention acquire an incomparable status – 
that is, special characteristics which only the initiated can divine. Culture is 
seen only in its uniqueness. Such approaches, drivenas they are to demon-
strate singularity, can easily fall prey to what I call the ‘tautology of excep-
tionalism’ or, even worse, to essentialism – meaning the argument that people 
behave as they do solely because of who they are. Groupings are thus reduced 
to what is deemed to be their ‘essence’. The risk then is that, eventually, the 
‘area’ under study (whether ethnic, regional or continental) is explained en-
tirely in terms of the attributes that are supposed to characterise it. 
 Another charge levelled against Area Studies is that they have frequently 
been too closely associated with foreign policy, particularly in the United 
States.6 Government funding of area specialists, asked to provide policy ad-
vice on demand, has made it inevitable that students and academics should 
have tailored their research to those fields of expertise that are most relevant 
to policy makers. The Cold War required Soviet specialists, so they were pro-
duced in droves. The wars in Southern Africa threatened regional stability, so 
Africanists were asked to give answers. The European Union expanded east-
ward, so Eastern Europeanists were quickly summoned. The scenario is famil-
iar. Yet, scholarly activities that are dependent on targeted government fund-
ing is liable to be both shallow and ephemeral. Policy concerns change and 
the focus of analysis with it. Specialists are forced to simplify what they know 
in order to answer short-term policy driven questions.  When they are wrong 
or when interest for their area wanes, they are left exposed to the cold winds 
of derision and forced to engage in an endless quest for further instrumentally 
justified funding. The reputation of Area Studies suffers as a consequence. 
 Apposite as these critiques are – and they do expose the vanity of the 
zealots who claim ‘unique’ expertise – they do not address the more serious 
issue of the ways in which an area focus may be relevant to comparative poli-
tics. However, before I tackle this crucial issue, I want to touch on some ques-
tions of definition. Although I have no wish to engage in a sustained delibera-
tion about the demarcation of our field of study, it is useful to remind our-
selves of some of the important assumptions that underpin our discipline.  
                                                 
6   Since 11 September 2001, there has been even more intense pressure on Area Studies 
specialists to address the needs of foreign policy and security issues.  Although such may 
appear today like a novel feature, it is well to remember that during the Cold War there 
were several periods when Area Studies were ‘directed’ to be more policy relevant. There-
fore, this is a well-worn pattern in the relationship between government and academic re-
search in the United States. 
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The chief tension at the heart of comparative politics lies between the theo-
retical demands of an ostensibly scientific scholarly activity and the need to 
provide an analysis that accounts for political processes in historical perspec-
tive. The argument today is between those who stress the theoretical impera-
tive – that is, the requirement to develop better, more compelling, ‘models’ of 
politics allowing systemic comparisons across the contemporary world – and 
those who favour analytical insights – that is, an approach tailored both to the 
questions asked and the areas concerned. Of course, all would claim that they 
want the best of both worlds but in reality there is, as there always has been, a 
deep-seated difference of emphasis between the two.  One seeks theoretical 
elegance, the other interpretative depth. 
 That debate is made all the starker because the theoretical banner is cur-
rently being flown in the United States by the rational choice advocates, 
whose call for rigour brooks no dissent. Their claims for conceptual clarity 
leave little space for those who do not subscribe to the economist fallacy that 
insights into human activities are best revealed mathematically. The attraction 
of rational choice theory is that it provides well-worn quantitative instru-
ments for comparison across the globe. The contention that political analysis 
must be contextually plausible is dismissed on the grounds that such an ap-
proach can never be ‘scientific’.7 We have here an attitude bordering on big-
otry, which the Lichbach & Zuckerman volume seeks to overcome, pleading 
as it does for more conceptual ecumenism. 8   
 But to return to the discussion that concerns us here, the growing intoler-
ance of rational choice theorists has indisputably contributed to the onslaught 
on Area Studies – that approach par excellence that is seen as being guilty of 
trying to explain the general by means of the (over-)particular. In assessing 
Area Studies, however, we ought not be constrained by the diktat of one par-
ticular school of thought. We need instead to go back to the roots of compara-
tive politics. Although the founding fathers of our discipline believed they 
were providing a framework of analysis that made it easier to understand 
political differences between countries, regions, or continents, they laboured 
under the assumption that there was but one model of political change. Their 
approach was predicated on an unilinear notion of political development. 
Such a postulate is still held by a number, although now perhaps no longer a 
majority, of our colleagues but the time has come to challenge it.   
                                                 
7   In truth, there is little possibility of dialogue with rational choice theorists because their 
allegation to advance the understanding of comparative politics rests on an axiomatic bias in 
favour of quantifiable methods and a reductionist definition of the ‘individual’ – not to 
mention an utter reluctance to confront the fact that the very paradigmatic development of 
the social sciences (including rational choice theory) is itself also historically bound. 
8   For a systematic discussion of various approaches in comparative politics and an appre-
ciation of the Lichbach & Zuckerman volume, see Culture Troubles. 
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Is it credible today to argue that all parts of the world are evolving politically 
along similar lines? Is globalisation (whatever it may mean) such as to induce 
an irreversible march towards a single political model, marking, as it were, 
not the ‘end of history’ but the ‘end of politics’.  The future is bright; the fu-
ture is democratic? Although this is indeed the view taken by a number of 
comparativists, a moment’s attention to the present complexities of world 
politics would suggest a little more caution. Are the current experiences of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan or Indonesia, for instance, mere 
hiccups in the movement of these three countries towards a cheerful ‘democ-
ratic’ future or are they indications that their political evolution is unlikely to 
follow the single model of development that has resulted in Western parlia-
mentary democracy, as we know it? Posed in this way the question leads to 
an answer that should be obvious to all but the theoretical ‘fundamentalists’.  
 The discipline of comparative politics needs a means to account for un-
anticipated or un-orthodox change, or else its heuristic value will simply 
wither. The social sciences must not aspire to the mathematical rigour of the 
physical sciences and should not, therefore, seek to emulate (and in so doing 
become bound by) their methods. Instead, they should aim to provide the 
conceptual framework that makes possible enlightening analysis and relevant 
contrasts. And for this reason alone, comparative politics needs to make place 
for Area Studies. The question, therefore, is not whether Area Studies are 
dead but under what conditions they may best contribute to comparative 
political understanding. 
 
Any discussion of the relevance of Area Studies to comparative politics must 
tackle three main questions: (1) how does one define an area of study; (2) how 
can one set up comparative questions which illuminate processes rather than 
reify differences; (3) how can one best account for dynamics and change over 
time.  I propose to discuss these questions in general terms and then, briefly, 
to illustrate my argument by showing how some of my recent work on Africa 
has applied in practice the ideas developed in this paper. 
 
 
 
What is an ‘area’? 
 
Although a simple question, it is critically important. Comparative politics 
requires heuristically meaningful units of analysis and not every criterion is 
equally valid in this respect. Geography, for example, may or may not be a 
relevant consideration. In and of itself, it might not be useful to compare 
neighbouring regions or countries. It is not clear, for instance, that the cur-
rently fashionable notion of a ‘Mediterranean basin’ is necessarily relevant.  
The first point to make, therefore, is that the choice of area is dependent on 
Area Studies and Comparative Politics: Africa in context 
 
477
 
the question(s) being asked. Some questions, such as ‘democratisation’ are so 
general that they lend themselves to comparisons between fairly large and 
relatively undifferentiated areas: how do democratic ‘transitions’ in Asia and 
Latin America compare? Others are very much more specific and require 
more precisely targeted ‘areas’: how does Islam affect political representation 
in West Africa and the Middle East?   
 From this point of view it is clear that the standard groupings of countries 
into aggregated regions such as Europe, North America, Latin America, Af-
rica, the Middle East, South or East Asia are not always the most relevant 
boundaries for Area Studies. It is, of course, sensible to acquire expertise in 
such regions but an enquiry bounded in this way may not always readily lend 
itself to an elucidation of the political questions under examination. Whilst 
there are good historical reasons why Area Centres have been created under 
these headings, we should not allow institutional weight to determine the 
most appropriate units of analysis. A study of corruption in Europe in the 
twentieth century would more sensibly group countries into ‘northern’ and 
‘southern’, or catholic and protestant, or industrial and rural areas. Equally, 
an enquiry into state intervention in the economy might more insightfully 
bring together countries of relatively similar GDP per capita throughout the 
world – Japan, Sweden, Austria, and Canada – than a more geographically 
focused comparison between, say, East and South Asian countries. 
 The point is plain: comparative politics must conceive of Area Studies in a 
creative way. Although often a specialisation in one of the obvious geographi-
cal regions of the world will serve as a useful platform for comparative analy-
sis, in many instances the notion of area will have to be redefined according to 
the questions being posed. By the same token, the questions being asked can-
not simply be chosen without consideration of the ‘areas’ to which they are 
meant to apply. For example, it would be unhelpful to study the relative po-
litical influence of Christian Democratic parties in Western and Eastern 
Europe. If the study aims to compare either party politics across the board in 
these two halves of Europe or the influence of religion on politics, then a focus 
on Christian Democracy is obviously not the most appropriate framework 
and might even be singularly unhelpful.   
 Presented in this way, the argument is obvious but it is well to remind 
ourselves that a very large proportion of what passes for applied comparative 
politics sets out to make sweeping comparisons across different parts of the 
world regardless of how instructive such enterprises are likely to be – other 
than in compiling yet another volume of country studies. An investigation 
into the role of city mayors in Europe and North America, for instance, would 
be relatively unenlightening since there is no common constitutionally agreed 
definition of the office in these countries. A study of the relationship between 
local and national political elites, on the other hand, would result in an infi-
nitely more revealing comparative exercise. 
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Whether one approaches the analysis of different countries/regions from the 
perspective of comparative politics or Area Studies, the value of the study 
undertaken will depend entirely on the purpose, range and scope of the ques-
tions asked. 
 
 
How to ask questions? 
 
The key issue here is how can one set up comparative questions that illumi-
nate processes rather than reify differences. The tension we have identified at 
the heart of our discipline between the theoretical imperative and the quest 
for interpretative depth is in this respect particularly acute. Theorists of com-
parative politics want above all to elaborate the instruments that will allow a 
discussion of the conceptually pregnant political questions across the globe. 
Area specialists believe that answering comparative questions demands an 
understanding of a particular region. The former want to investigate what 
matters to political ‘theory’; the latter want to make sense of what they wit-
ness.   
 This is an issue that cannot be resolved a priori, and even less by fiat.  It is 
the creative opposition that lies at the heart of our field of study and which 
makes it both fascinating and potentially fruitful, for the need to reconcile 
these two demands ought to encourage us to produce work that elucidates 
the events taking place. And in this respect, asking the ‘right’ questions is 
more important than giving the ‘right’ answers – pace the policy makers!  This, 
I believe, entails a certain approach, a method, which it is important to dis-
cuss.   
 First, it is essential to seek to address ‘real’ questions: questions that arise 
from what is happening, concretely, in one or several parts of the world, and 
not questions that appear interesting from a pre-conceived theoretical, or even 
ideological perspective. For example, it is more useful to ask why young Mus-
lims in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Algeria resort to fundamentalist ‘violence’ 
rather than why there is ‘terrorism’ in the world? Or, to investigate why mul-
tiparty elections in Africa do not appear to enhance parliamentary democracy 
rather than whether ‘democratisation’ is spreading throughout the world. Or, 
to analyse why the effects of corruption in East Asia and Africa have differing 
economic consequences, rather than whether corruption is an indication of 
‘underdevelopment’.   
 Second, there should in our approach be no presumed notion of causality, 
by which I simply mean that we should keep an open mind as to what the 
answers to the questions might be. Of course, we need to have working hy-
potheses about the nature of the processes we observe. But we should not pre-
judge how the outcome of our analysis will derive from the factors we deem 
useful to examine. We know, for example, that the quest to identify social 
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classes in the Third World has long been at the forefront of much comparative 
work. But to presume that the existence, or absence, of certain classes will 
provide a convincing explanation of political processes is to impose an a priori 
ideological causality that is likely to hinder useful interpretation. Or, we may 
enquire as to whether urbanisation loosens ascriptive bonds such as ethnicity, 
but we should not ask questions that presume only to elicit answers confirm-
ing that living in a city automatically strengthens processes of individualisa-
tion. Or, we may test whether societies that eschew ostentation – such as, for 
instance, Sweden – are less corrupt than those that favour it, but we should 
not necessarily ignore the possibility that what passes for corruption is cultur-
ally bound and that it may have other, more subterranean, causes. 
 Third, the conceptual framework that we employ should be relevant to 
the comparative questions we ask. It is a founding myth of our discipline that 
the theoretical models we construct are equally relevant to all polities.  But the 
truth is that ours is not a physical science and, much as some of us keep 
dreaming of ‘grand theories’, there is in fact no single ‘model’ that is equally 
applicable to all areas, for all times. Yet, the quest for a general model goes on 
in certain quarters and there is always pressure on comparativists to evolve 
inclusive, rather than exclusive, paradigms. The measure of the relevance of 
what we do is still often measured in terms of the extension of its application: 
the more universal our ambition, the better. But it is obvious now that such a 
quest is illusory and it is here that Area Studies can help bring a healthy dose 
of pragmatism to a discipline that sometimes loses touch with reality. To give 
but one example, a model of development that assumes modernisation goes 
hand in hand with the greater secularisation of society would not help us 
usefully to compare the nature of political representation in the former Soviet 
States of Central Asia and the European Union.   
 Fourth, and following from the previous point, paradigms should be 
constructed by induction rather than deduction: that is, models should arise 
from the particulars of comparative analysis rather than from (grand) theo-
ries. This may irk the purists amongst us who yearn to approach problems 
armed with a cast-iron framework but it will not surprise those who are more 
concerned to make sense of what happens. The defect of over-generalised 
models, as is repeatedly demonstrated by the failure of political scientists 
turned pundits to speak sensibly about the great crises of the contemporary 
period, is that it appears to give them an ‘expertise’, which their knowledge of 
the area under discussion scarcely merits. As such, they frequently fail to ask 
the simple, or obvious, questions.   
 Examples abound. The demise of communist parties in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe was in principle to be applauded because com-
parative theory seemed to suggest that it would unleash ‘democracy’. In prac-
tice, it has done so in some settings and not in others – an appreciation that 
any area specialist could have offered in an instant. Similarly, and also accord-
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ing to current theories, democracy is taken to be more conducive than state 
authoritarianism to economic development. Unfortunately, the case of the 
erstwhile Asian Tigers demonstrates precisely the opposite – as any specialist 
of East Asia would demonstrate in a matter of seconds. 
 In brief, it will be obvious that asking the right questions requires 
aknowledge of Area Studies. Comparativists cannot achieve their ambitions 
unless they know how to deploy the right framework for the right ‘area’ of 
enquiry. It is simply vacuous to pretend that any student of comparative poli-
tics can apply any given model to any collection of case studies in the hope 
thereby to advance knowledge, either of comparative politics or of the coun-
tries selected for examination. To be interested in political parties, or in civil 
servants, or in revolutions, or in corruption, is not enough to generate re-
search that will produce comparative insights. It is only possible to set up 
interesting comparative investigations on the basis of a serious prior knowl-
edge of the historical, social, cultural, economic and political context of the 
areas to be studied in depth. I will illustrate this point in respect of Africa 
below. 
 
 
How to explain change? 
 
Ultimately, the true test of comparative analysis is the insight it provides in 
terms of explaining processes over time. Since by now it ought to be clear that 
theories in the social sciences also evolve over time, the question arises as to 
how such an evolution takes place. On paper, of course, the answer is 
straightforward. Hypotheses are formulated, tested in the field, and theory 
reformed accordingly. In reality, it is not nearly so straightforward.  Theories 
continue to flourish long after it has become plain that they no longer apply: 
witness, for example, the time lag between our changing perception of the 
role of the state in Africa and the changes in approach made by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. Furthermore, realpolitik and foreign policy imperatives 
greatly influence frameworks of analysis, regardless of what is happening in 
the real world: consider the current emphasis on the constructive role of ‘civil 
society’, a concept which few understand concretely.   
 Here too I want to suggest that our discipline can only fruitfully evolve in 
tandem with Area Studies, and this for two main reasons. The first is that the 
knowledge required to assess whether particular paradigms are useful in 
terms of explaining the evolution of various polities can only come from an 
in-depth study of the historical changes taking place in those particular re-
gions. In other words, the only way to find out whether conclusions reached 
by means of synchronic comparative analysis stand the test of time is to ob-
serve what happens in the field diachronically. For this reason alone, it is 
unrealistic for comparativists, even those of a theoretical disposition, not to 
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possess and cultivate an area expertise. It is Area Studies that feed the concep-
tual reflection from which paradigmatic shifts in our discipline will derive.  
Making sense of what happens on the ground over time is the material that 
drives forward the refinement of the analytical frameworks we employ. 
 The second is that the debate about theories and concepts should logically 
arise from the puzzles generated by new and, at times, unexpected events in 
different parts of the world. One of the great weaknesses of our discipline is 
that it has been relentlessly driven by our perceptions of the evolution of the 
West. Our areas of interest, our hypotheses, our paradigms almost always 
originate in the attempt we have made to make sense of the comparative dif-
ferences between relatively similar political processes in the so-called ad-
vanced world. Naturally, we then seek to find elsewhere confirmation for the 
theories advanced in respect of change in the West. But this will no longer do. 
The limitations of such an approach are all too evident, as my discussion be-
low on Africa will show. 
 I want, however, to stress one aspect of this shortcoming that is well nigh 
lethal to our theoretical ambitions. The inability to acknowledge that the 
models we employ are very largely derived from the experience of our own 
societies masks the extent to which our conceptual frameworks are a-
historical. Because we are aware of the changes taking place in our own part 
of the world, we lose sight of the ways in which we automatically adjust what 
are largely synchronic comparisons to historical changes, which we know by 
dint of our living in that particular area. For instance, it is generally under-
stood that political parties in the West are less and less dependent on identifi-
able social classes – not because our conceptualisation of the party has 
changed radically but because we have instinctively fine-tuned our analysis of 
party politics to this important historical evolution, which we have come to 
know, as it were, by osmosis.   
 However, when it comes to other geographical settings we fail to take 
into account the extent to which our theories are a-historical and why, there-
fore, they may be unable plausibly to account for change over time. Witness 
the conventional, and (it has to be said) relatively superficial, way in which 
most comparative volumes come to study political parties in Asia or Africa – 
as though these groupings were intrinsically similar to those in, say, the 
United States. Here too, then, only the information derived from an Area 
Studies expertise can provide the historical knowledge needed meaningfully 
to apply a comparative analytical framework.   
 The point, therefore, is that comparative politics can most fruitfully be 
used to explain the real, as opposed to the imagined, world if it is nourished 
by history. The only way realistically to appreciate historical change over time 
is to acquire an area expertise. And the only way political scientists can de-
ploy historical knowledge creatively is to test their hypotheses against the 
conclusions that are reached by the specialist historian (and even anthropolo-
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gist). As is obvious to any scholar who works long enough on any particular 
area, the changes that take place in the present always have deep, usually 
infinitely complex, root systems in its long history. All comparativists thus 
need to be area historians. There is no place for a-historical comparative poli-
tics. 
 
 
An illustration: ‘democratisation’ in Black Africa 
 
I end with a brief discussion of one particular example of a thriving field of 
comparative analysis: the study of ‘democratisation’ as it is applied to Black 
Africa. On the face of it this is a case of an appropriate, well-defined and theo-
retically coherent study. The area is clearly demarcated: Black (or formerly 
colonised) Africa. The question is justified by events on the grounds: virtually 
all such countries since the end of the eighties have evolved from being one-
party states to holding multiparty elections. The issue is conceptually clear: 
have these elections advanced the consolidation of a democratic order? The 
minimal definition of democracy is relatively uncontentious and includes, 
inter alia, regular elections, free and fair polls, peaceful regime changes and 
some form of parliamentary system. The approach involves a model of 
change over time from multiparty elections to the establishment, and later 
consolidation, of democratic rule (as adjudged by the regularity of subsequent 
polls).   
 Nevertheless, I would argue here that the study of ‘democratisation’ in 
Black Africa as it is presently being carried out is largely misconceived.  Not 
because an interest in this subject is inappropriate, since there is evidently an 
international context in which more and more countries are holding multi-
party elections. It is because in most instances the aim of such research is to 
establish whether the political transitions taking place – dubbed all too easily 
‘democratisation’ – are bringing about enhanced political accountability, fa-
cilitating economic development and reducing poverty. But a close study of 
African politics would show that the answer to these questions is not best 
served by the examination of multiparty voting. In fact, concentrating atten-
tion on such elections is likely to obscure the analysis of the very political 
processes that matter most for the nature of accountability and the prospect 
for growth – as many Africa specialists never tire of explaining. The hypothe-
sis that multiparty polls ipso facto  bring about greater political choice and 
freedom, and thereby improves representation as well as political responsibil-
ity cannot be taken for granted. It must be examined in actual case studies. 
Readers of Africa Works will know that the book attempts to explain how, on 
the continent, power is exercised by means of the straddling of formal and 
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informal political processes.9 Studying Africa over time, from the pre- to the 
post-colonial period, it becomes obvious that the measure of accountability is 
determined by the norms of what is often called the neo-patrimonial system. 
Within such a context, the legitimacy of political leaders is determined not 
primarily by their electoral strength but according to their ability to distribute 
resources to their clients, often on an ethnic basis. Thus, multiparty elections 
are seen as, and in turn lead to, intra-elite competition for control of state 
resources. Therefore, such electoral contests are unlikely to lead to greater 
political accountability in the sense in which it is usually understood in the 
West – that is, greater dedication to the promotion of the common weal.   
 Equally, the notion of power extant – neo-patrimonialism – is inimical to 
economic development as it took place in the West, or later in Asia.  This is 
because it fails to foster, and in many ways totally undermines, economic 
growth – which is, and remains, the prime basis for sustainable development. 
In African political systems, political representation and legitimacy are based 
on the maintenance of a situation in which patrons must simultaneously up-
hold the image of substance their station requires and feed the networks on 
which their position depends. Thus, they can scarcely defer consumption and 
expenditure for the longer-term purpose of ‘national’ economic growth. That 
is why African states as well as entrepreneurs rarely invest in economically 
productive activities. 
 To conclude, then, this briefest of examples illustrates the extent to which 
meaningful comparative analysis is dependent on Area Studies expertise. 
Clearly, Africa specialists would be aware of the limitations of a study of 
‘democratisation’ and would account differently for the political processes 
that have marked the continent since independence. At the very least, their 
contribution would be steeped in the knowledge that elections in Africa have 
more often than not resulted in divisions and violence. Comparativists at-
tempting to study Africa from the perspective a more general theory of de-
mocratisation are likely to reach misleading conclusions about the putative 
trajectory of the continent in the years ahead. Whether greater democracy will 
come to Africa or not is uncertain, regardless of the holding of multiparty 
elections. If or when it does, however, it is unlikely to be because of outside 
pressure. More importantly, it is unlikely to be in the Western garb with 
which we are familiar. 
 
 
                                                 
9  Chabal, P. / Daloz, J.-P.  1999:  Africa Works: disorder as political instrument.  Oxford: 
James Currey.   
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